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Abstract— Password security can no longer provide enough 
security in the area of remote user authentication. Considering 
this security drawback, researchers are trying to find solution 
with multifactor remote user authentication system. Recently, 
three factor remote user authentication using biometric and 
smart card has drawn a considerable attention of the researchers. 
However, most of the current proposed schemes have security 
flaws. They are vulnerable to attacks like user impersonation 
attack, server masquerading attack, password guessing attack, 
insider attack, denial of service attack, forgery attack, etc. Also, 
most of them are unable to provide mutual authentication, 
session key agreement and password, or smart card recovery 
system. Considering these drawbacks, we propose a secure three 
factor user authentication scheme using biometric and smart 
card. Through security analysis, we show that our proposed 
scheme can overcome drawbacks of existing systems and ensure 
high security in remote user authentication. 
 
Index Terms— Remote User Authentication, Three Factor, 
Biometric, Smart Card.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ODAY, most authentication systems rely on passwords. A 
password is a word or string of characters used for 
authentication by a user to prove identity or to gain access 
approval to a resource (example: an access code is a type of 
password); a password is to be kept secret from those not 
allowed access. So, a numerous attempts [1]-[4] have been 
taken to protect password from being compromised. However, 
the crackers are able to steal password despite those attempts. 
This is due to the user’s habit of using password. Most of the 
users use weak passwords [5]; they also reuse same password 
in several accounts that causes domino effect [6]. According 
to [5], the average user has 6.5 passwords, each of which is 
shared across 3.9 different websites. Each user types an 
average of 8 passwords per day with an average bit-strength of 
40.54 bits and has approximate 25 web accounts that require  
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passwords to access. It is also mentioned that a large number 
of passwords chosen by the users only contain lowercase 
letters unless forced to do otherwise. Such weak passwords 
can be guessed by the attacker easily. Increasing password 
strength may be a solution, but it cannot increase the security 
by a large degree. The strength of password can be increased 
by mixing up the lowercase letters, uppercase letters, digits, 
signs and special characters. But, such kinds of passwords are 
difficult to remember. It reduces the security of a system 
because (1) users might need to store these passwords (2) 
users will need to reset them frequently, and (3) users are 
more likely reuse the same password. According to [5] at least 
1.5% of Yahoo users forget their passwords each month. 
 
For these reasons, several methods like password 
management software, graphical password schemes, cognitive 
authentication scheme, one time passwords, hardware tokens, 
phone aided schemes, biometrics, etc., are proposed to replace 
password [7]. However, none of them provides good usability, 
deployability, and strong security at the same time [7]. In 2000 
and after wards, several smart card based schemes were 
proposed [8]-[10]. But, all of them have several weaknesses. 
 
Recently, biometric and smart card based user 
authentication schemes along with password have drawn a 
considerable attention from the researchers [11]-[16]. The 
biometric keys are based on physiological and behavioral 
characteristics of persons such as fingerprints, faces, irises, 
hand geometry, palm-prints, etc. The advantages of using 
biometric key are given bellow: 
• They cannot be forgotten or lost. 
• They cannot be copied or shared easily. 
• They are extremely hard to forge or distribute. 
• They cannot be guessed easily. 
• They prevent non-repudiation. 
 
Considering these advantages, researchers develop their 
schemes to enhance the security of remote user authentication 
system. But, all of their schemes have several weaknesses. In 
particular, the scheme proposed by Li et al. [16] is vulnerable 
to attacks like user impersonation attack, server masquerading 
attack, password guessing attack, insider attack, denial of 
service attack, forgery attack, etc. The other proposed schemes 
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are also vulnerable to one or more of the above mentioned 
attacks. Additionally, most of them are unable to provide 
mutual authentication, session key agreement and password, 
or smart card recovery system. 
 
In this paper, we propose a three factor user authentication 
scheme using biometric and smart card that can resist all the 
above mentioned attacks and is able to provide mutual 
authentication, session key agreement and password, or smart 
card recovery system. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section Ⅱ 
discusses related works, Section Ⅲ describes Li et al. [16] 
scheme briefly and Section Ⅳ discusses the security flaws of 
their scheme. Then, proposed scheme and its security analysis 
are presented in Section V and Section VI respectively. 
Finally, we draw our conclusion in Section VII.   
II. RELATED WORKS 
A highly secure system requires secure authentication 
system to deal with high level of security risk. To ensure that 
type of security, multi-factor user authentication system comes 
into account. Nowadays, the biometric and smart card based 
user authentication schemes along with password have drawn 
a considerable amount of attention from the researchers [11]-
[16].  
 
In 2010, an efficient biometric-based remote user 
authentication scheme using smart card [11] was proposed by 
Hwang et al. They claimed that the computation cost of their 
work was relatively low compared with other related schemes. 
Their proposed scheme is based on smart card, one way hash 
function and biometric verification. Their scheme can resist 
masquerading attack, replay attack, parallel session attack and 
can provide the security of the information stored within the 
smart card. Moreover, it enables the user to change their 
password freely, provides mutual authentication between the 
remote server and the user, doesn’t need to store any password 
or identity tables, doesn’t require any synchronized clock and 
provides non-repudiation.  
 
Das presented an analysis and improvement on an efficient 
biometric based remote user authentication scheme using 
smart cards in [14]. He claimed that the scheme proposed by 
Hwang et al. [11] has design flaws in login and authentication 
phase, password change phase, and verification of biometrics 
using hash function. He provided an improved scheme to fix 
these flaws. In this scheme, the user can freely change 
password by providing both old and new passwords. He also 
provided a security analysis to show that their scheme can fix 
the security flaws of [11]. 
 
In [15], An revealed the security flaws of the scheme 
proposed by Das [14]. He showed that the scheme presented in 
[14] is vulnerable to user impersonation attack, server 
masquerading attack, password guessing attack, and insider 
attack and it cannot provide mutual authentication. He 
proposed security analysis and enhancements of an effective 
biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using 
smart cards to overcome these security weaknesses of [14], 
while preserving all its merits. He claimed that his scheme can 
prevent user impersonation attack, server masquerading 
attack, password guessing attack, insider attack and can 
provide mutual authentication. 
In 2013, Li et al. conducted a detail analysis on [15] and 
revealed some weaknesses such as vulnerability to denial of 
service attack, and forgery attack and inability to provide 
session key agreement [16]; they proposed a robust biometric 
based remote user authentication scheme with session key 
agreement using elliptical curve cryptography [16] to 
overcome these weaknesses. They also provided a security 
analysis to show that their scheme can overcome the security 
flaws of the scheme proposed in [15]. They claimed that their 
scheme can provide the security of secret key, session key 
agreement, proper biometric authentication, quick detection of 
unauthorized login, proper mutual authentication, prevent 
forgery attack, stolen smart card attack, and replay attack. In 
the following section, we briefly discuss the scheme presented 
by Li et al. 
III. REVIEW OF LI ET AL.’S SCHEME 
The scheme uses a fuzzy extractor which is a pair of 
procedure (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅) such that: 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖) = (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) (1) 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅(𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  (2) 
where, 𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  is reasonably close to 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 . 
 
 
TABLE I 
THE NOTATIONS USED THROUGH OUT THIS PAPER 
Notation Description 
𝑅𝑅 Trusted registration center 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  Server
 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  User 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  An attacker
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  Identity of the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  Password and new password of the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  Biometric template or key of the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐  Recovery contact of the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
𝑃𝑃, 𝐺𝐺 Two large prime numbers 
𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅  A finite field 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) An elliptic curve defined on finite field 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅  with prime 
number order 𝐺𝐺 
𝑃𝑃 A point on elliptic curve 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) with order 𝐺𝐺 
ℎ(. ) A secure hash function 
𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 Master secret key for server 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 Master secret key for user 
𝐾𝐾, 𝑃𝑃, 𝑅𝑅1–𝑅𝑅8 A secret random strings 
𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  The AES key of the trusted registration center 𝑅𝑅 
𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  The AES key of the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (. ) Encryption function for AES 
𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (. ) Decryption function for AES 
𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  Session key 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 Status message 
∥ Message concatenation operator 
⨁ Exclusive-or operator 
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Initially, 𝑅𝑅 chooses an elliptic curve equation 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) over 
a prime finite field 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅  and a base point 𝑃𝑃 with order 𝐺𝐺 over 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) and publishes parameters (𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏), 𝐺𝐺, 𝑃𝑃). It also 
chooses a master secret key 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 and distributes it to the server 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. 
There are four phases in this scheme: the registration phase, 
the login phase, the authentication and key agreement phase, 
and the password change phase. 
A. Registration Phase 
During this phase, the registration center 𝑅𝑅 and the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
have to perform the following steps: 
 
1) Registration Request 
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  provides his 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  at the fuzzy extractor 
and a random number 𝐾𝐾. The 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  sends 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  to the 
registration center 𝑅𝑅 via a secure channel. 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = ℎ(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝐾𝐾) (3) 
 
2) Data Processing 
The 𝑅𝑅 computes 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  using (5), (4), (6) and 
(1) respectively. 
 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) (4) 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠)⨁ℎ(𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) (5) 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) (6) 
 
3) Card Preparation 
The 𝑅𝑅 stores (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , ℎ(. )) on the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖’s smart card and 
sends it to the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  via a secure channel. 
4) Finalization 
The 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  enters 𝐾𝐾 into the smart card. 
B. Login Phase 
During this phase, the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  performs the following steps: 
 
1) Biometric Verification 
The 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  inserts the smart card into a card reader and also 
provides 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  to a specific device with fuzzy 
extractor and generates 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  using (2). Then, the smart card 
computes 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  by placing provided 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and calculated 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  at 
(4). If 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , then the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  passes biometric 
verification and continues the following steps. Otherwise, 
the session is terminated. 
2) Password Verification 
The smart card computes 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  using (3) and by 
placing provided 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and calculated 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  at (6) 
respectively. It checks whether 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  or not. If they are 
equal, then 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  are verified and smart card 
performs the next step. Otherwise, the session is 
terminated. 
3) Login Request 
The smart card computes 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2 and 𝑀𝑀3 using (7), (8) and 
(9) respectively. 
 
𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖⨁ℎ(𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) (7) 
𝑀𝑀2 = 𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 where 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺∗  (8) 
𝑀𝑀3 = ℎ(𝑀𝑀1 ∥ 𝑀𝑀2) (9) 
 
The 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  sends a login request {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑀𝑀3} to the server 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . 
C. Authentication and Session Key Agreement Phase 
During this phase, the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  perform the 
following steps: 
 
1) User ID Validation 
The 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  checks the format of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . 
2) Login Request Verification 
If 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  is valid, then the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  computes 𝑀𝑀4 and 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐3 using 
following equations: 
 
𝑀𝑀4 = ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) (10) 
𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐3 = ℎ(𝑀𝑀4 ∥ 𝑀𝑀2) (11) 
 
It checks whether 𝑀𝑀3 = 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐3 or not. If they are equal, the 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  accepts login request message and validity of the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
is authenticated by the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . Otherwise, the session is 
terminated. 
3) Mutual Authentication Request 
The server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  computes 𝑀𝑀5 and 𝑀𝑀6 using (12) and (13) 
respectively. 
 
𝑀𝑀5 = 𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃 where 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺∗  (12) 
𝑀𝑀6 = ℎ(𝑀𝑀4 ∥ 𝑀𝑀2 ∥ 𝑀𝑀5) (13) 
 
It sends a mutual authentication message {𝑀𝑀5, 𝑀𝑀6} to the 
user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . 
4) Mutual Authentication Process 
After receiving reply, the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  checks whether 𝑀𝑀6 =
𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐6 or not. The 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐6 is calculated as follow: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐6 = ℎ(𝑀𝑀1 ∥ 𝑀𝑀2 ∥ 𝑀𝑀5) (14) 
 
If they are equal, then the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  is authenticated by the 
user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and mutual authentication is completed. 
5) Session Key Generation 
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  compute a shared key using 
(15). 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 = ℎ(𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀5) = ℎ(𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀2) = ℎ(𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃) (15) 
 
It is used for future confidential communication. 
D. Password Change Phase 
During this phase, the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  performs the following steps: 
 
1) Biometric Verification 
The 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  inserts his smart card into a card reader and also 
provides 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  to a specific device with fuzzy 
extractor and generates 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  using (2). Then, smart card 
computes 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  by placing provided 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and calculated 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  at 
(4) and compares it with 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  which is stored into the smart 
card. If 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , then the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  passes biometric 
verification and continues the following steps. 
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2) Password Verification 
The smart card computes 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  using (3) and by 
placing provided 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and calculated 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  at (6) 
respectively and checks whether 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  or not. If they are 
equal, then 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  are verified and smart card 
performs the next step. The user inputs his new password 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 . 
3) Data Procession for New Password 
The smart card computes 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  using (3) and (6) 
respectively and by replacing 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  by 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  by 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 . The 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  is calculated as follow: 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖⨁ℎ(𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖)⨁ℎ(𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ) (16) 
 
4) Finalization 
The smart card replaces 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  by 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  
respectively to complete the phase. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE LI ET AL.’S SCHEME 
 In this section, we discuss security weaknesses of the 
scheme proposed by Li et al. [16]. We assume that the attacker 
Ai can control the insecure channel. 
A. Password Guessing Attack Using Stolen Smart Card 
If 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  can manage to steal the smart card, then he can extract 
information from the card by examining the power 
consumption signal [17]-[18]. He also can manage 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  by 
capturing one of the login request messages or simply using 
shoulder surfing technique. When the attacker manages to 
achieve information like 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐾𝐾, ℎ(. ), he can conduct 
password guessing attack.  
 
Consider that the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  selects a password 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  from a massive 
database of passwords. Then, he computes 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  and 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  
using (3) and (6) respectively and by replacing 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  
and 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 . He checks whether 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  or not. If 
they are equal, the selected password is correct. Otherwise, he 
repeats the process again. 
B. User impersonation Attack 
User impersonation attack can be launched after password 
guessing attack using stolen smart card. From previous 
discussion, we know that the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  has (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 , 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 
ℎ(. ), 𝐾𝐾) from smart card and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  as well as password 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  
from password guessing attack. Moreover, the parameters 
(𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅(𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏), 𝐺𝐺, 𝑃𝑃) which are published by the registration center 
𝑅𝑅, are stored in the smart card or published in a public 
domain. So, he can manage to gather these parameters, 
perform the following steps and try to login to the remote 
server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . 
 
1) Login Request by 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  
The 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  computes 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  using (3) and by replacing 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  
with 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 . It also calculates 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2 and 𝑀𝑀3 using (7), (8) 
and (9) respectively and by replacing 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 . It 
sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑀𝑀3} to the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . 
2) User ID Validation by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives message sent by the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  and verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . 
3) Login Request Verification by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
If 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  is valid, then the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  computes 𝑀𝑀4 and 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐3 from (10) 
and (11) respectively. It checks whether 𝑀𝑀3 = 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐3 or not. 
If they are equal, the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  authenticates the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  as valid 
user. 
4) Mutual Authentication Request by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  computes 𝑀𝑀5 and 𝑀𝑀6 using (12) and (13) 
respectively and sends a mutual authentication message 
{𝑀𝑀5, 𝑀𝑀6} to the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 . 
5) Mutual Authentication Process by 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  
After receiving reply, the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  calculates 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐6 using 
(14) and checks whether 𝑀𝑀6 = 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐6 or not. If they are 
equal, then the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  is authenticated by the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  
and the mutual authentication is completed. 
6) Session Key Generation by 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  compute shared key 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 
using (15) and use it for future confidential 
communication. 
C. Security of the Secret Key 
The secret key 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 remains stored in the server. Generally, 
the server stores this type of information in a database or in a 
file. Because of 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 being unique for every user, the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
has to maintain a mapping of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠. According to the 
discussion in [6], information stored in the server database 
could be compromised. Therefore, this scheme is unable to 
provide the security of secret key. 
D. Server Masquerading Attack 
If the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  can manage to steal the secret key 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 as 
discussed in previous section, then it can launch attack as 
follow: 
 
1) Login Request by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  computes 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2 and 𝑀𝑀3 using  (3), (7), (8) 
and (9) and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑀𝑀3} to the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  (because the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  
is masquerading as server). 
2) Login Request Verification by 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  
The 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  receives message sent by the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and computes 𝑀𝑀4 
and 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐3 using (10) and (11) respectively and checks 
whether 𝑀𝑀3 = 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐3 or not. If they are equal, then the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  
authenticates the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  as valid user. 
3) Mutual Authentication Request by 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  
The 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  computes 𝑀𝑀5 and 𝑀𝑀6 using (12) and (13) 
respectively and sends a mutual authentication message 
{𝑀𝑀5, 𝑀𝑀6} to the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . 
4) Mutual Authentication Process by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
After receiving reply, the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  calculates 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐6 using (14) 
and checks whether 𝑀𝑀6 = 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐6 or not. If they are equal, 
then the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  (because the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  believes the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  as server) is 
authenticated by the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and the mutual authentication 
is completed. 
5) Session Key Generation by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖   
The user C𝑖𝑖  and attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  compute a shared key 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 
using (15) and use it for future confidential 
communication. 
E. Password or Smart Card Recovery  
There is no password or smart card recovery phase in this 
scheme. According to the discussion of [5], the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  can 
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forget his password. If he forgets his password, there is no 
way he ever can get logged in. Moreover, if the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  
somehow can manage to steal the smart card of the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , 
then the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  will not be able to recover the smart card. 
F. Mutual Authentication 
According to [15], if authentication scheme is insecure 
against user impersonation attack and server masquerading 
attack, then the authentication schemes cannot provide mutual 
authentication between the user and the remote server. 
Therefore, this scheme fails to provide mutual authentication 
according to the discussion in subsection IV(B) and IV(D). 
V. PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section, we first discuss some preliminary knowledge 
and then, we present our scheme. 
A. Background 
1) Accessing Smart Card 
An attacker can access information of a smart card by using 
power analysis attack [17]-[18]. There are two types of power 
analysis attack: Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack and 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. In SPA attack, the 
attacker visually inspects the system’s power consumption. 
The DPA attack is more powerful than the SPA attack because 
the attacker does not need to know as many details about how 
the algorithm was implemented. 
2) Biometric Key Generation 
Biometric cryptosystem and cancelable biometrics represent 
emerging technologies to release biometric keys as well as 
provide privacy to biometric templates [19]. Dodis et al. 
claimed that strong biometric keys can be generated from 
biometric templates using fuzzy extractor [20]. An efficient 
cancelable biometric key generation scheme for cryptographic 
use that can generate 256 bit keys from fingerprint templates 
is proposed in [21] and an efficient approach for non-
invertible cryptographic key generation from cancelable 
fingerprint biometrics is proposed at [22]. Jagadeesan et al. 
[23] proposed a cryptographic key generation scheme from 
multiple biometric modalities that can generate 256 bit key. 
One of these efficient key generation methods can be used in 
our proposed scheme. 
3) Hash Function 
A cryptographic hash function is a mathematical algorithm 
that maps data of arbitrary size to a bit string of a fixed size (a 
hash function) which is designed to be one-way function, that 
is, a function which is infeasible to invert [24]. The example 
of hash functions are MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2 family, SHA-3 
family, etc. The MD5 and SHA-1 are no longer recommended 
due to security reason. Either SHA-2 family or SHA-3 family 
should be used to generate message digest. 
4) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)   
AES is a symmetric key algorithm where a single key named 
private key is used for both encryption and decryption purpose 
[25]. It is also known as Rijndael. It is based on a design 
principle known as substitution-permutation network. It is a 
block cipher with three different key lengths: 128, 192 and 
256 bits. The degree of security relies on the key length. 
Despite the different key length AES operate on 128 bits plain 
text block and generates 128 bits cipher text. The performance 
of AES is very convincing. It is a high speed algorithm and 
also requires low RAM. Therefore, it can be implemented 
from 8 bit smart card to high performance computer. 
B. Our Proposed Scheme 
Our proposed scheme consists of six phases that includes 
server registration phase, user registration phase, login and 
authentication phase, password change phase, password 
recovery phase, and smart card recovery phase. Also, we have 
few assumptions under which our proposed scheme worked 
properly. They are given bellow: 
• User or server id is unique but not a secret. 
• Password is secret but it may not be unique. 
• Biometric key is unique and very hard to be copied, 
shared and distributed. 
• AES keys are secret and the attacker cannot steal 
them. 
• Smart card can be stolen and information stored in 
smart card can be revealed. 
• The attacker cannot manage to steal smart card, 
password and biometric key at the same time.  
• The attacker cannot take over secure channel. 
• The attacker has control over insecure channel. 
C. Server Registration Phase 
During the server registration phase, the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  and the 
registration center 𝑅𝑅 will perform the following steps: 
 
1) Registration Request by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The server sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟 and sends {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
to the registration center 𝑅𝑅. 
2) Secret Generation and Reply by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . If 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟, then it checks into its database. If the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
is already registered, then it discards the process. 
Otherwise, it chooses a secret random string 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺1 and 
generates 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 using (17). 
 
Fig. 1.  Server registration phase which involves the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  and the 
registration center 𝑅𝑅 
  
International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security (IJCSIS), 
Vol. 15, No. 6, June 2017
148 https://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500 
  
𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 = ℎ(𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺1) (17) 
 
It sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐 and sends {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
through a secure channel. 
3) Secret Storage and Acknowledgement by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝑅𝑅 and checks 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  matches with its own and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐, 
then it calculates 𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 using (18). 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 , 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (18) 
 
It stores 𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 into its database. It sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 and 
sends {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅. 
4) Finalization by 𝑅𝑅 
After receiving acknowledgement {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , the 𝑅𝑅 calculates 𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 as follow: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 ,𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (19) 
 
It stores {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠} into its database. The server 
registration phase is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
D. User Registration Phase 
During user registration phase, the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , the registration 
center 𝑅𝑅, and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  will perform the following steps: 
 
1) Registration Request by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  needs to choose his user identification 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
password 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , recovery contact 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 , collect server 
identification 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  which is published publicly, and 
imprint his biometrics in a specific device which can 
generate biometric key 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  form biometrics. He also 
calculates 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  as follow: 
 
𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = ℎ(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖) (20) 
 
Then, he sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the registration center 𝑅𝑅 through a secure 
channel. 
2) Registration Request by 𝑅𝑅 
The registration center 𝑅𝑅 receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . If 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟 and 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  is already registered, then it generates a secret 
random string 𝑃𝑃 and calculates 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 using (21). 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃 ∥ 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  (21) 
 
The R sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
through a secure channel. 
3) Secret Generation, Storage and Reply by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝑅𝑅. 
It verifies 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If the verification passes, then it proceeds; 
otherwise, it discards the request. If the verification passes 
and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟, then it calculates 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠, 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 and 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  
using (22), (23) and (24) respectively. 
 
𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 , 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (22) 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = ℎ(𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) (23) 
𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 , 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (24) 
 
Then, it stores {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖} into its database, sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the registration 
center 𝑅𝑅 through a secure channel. 
4) Card Preparation and Delivery by 𝑅𝑅 
The R receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺, 
then it confirms that the registration process in the server 
has completed. Then, it calculates 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 and 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 using (25) 
and (26) respectively. 
 
𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 ,𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (25) 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 = 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑃𝑃 (26) 
 
It stores {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠} into a smart card and 
distributes it to the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. 
 
5) Card Receive and Acknowledgement by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  receives the smart card from the 𝑅𝑅. Then, he puts 
the smart card into a card reader and checks 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . 
If they are correct, then he provides 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and imprints his 
biometrics to the specific device to generate biometric key 
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 . Then, he calculates 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  by putting 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  at (20) 
and compares whether 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  or not. If the 
verification passes, then he accepts the card, sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a 
secure channel. 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ,𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖) (27) 
 
He calculates 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  using (27) and replaces 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 in the smart 
card. He also removes 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  from the card. If the verification 
fails, he rejects the card, sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 and sends a 
failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 and discards 
process. 
 
6) Data Storage and Finalization by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes, then it checks 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐. If 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐, then it confirms that the card has reached 
to its designated user. Then, it calculates 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  and 
𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  as follow: 
 
Fig. 2.  User registration phase which involves the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , the registration 
center 𝑅𝑅 and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
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𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ,𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (28) 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 ,𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (29) 
𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ,𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (30) 
 
It stores {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 } into its database. If  
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 or if the verification fails, then it discards 
the process and sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟 and sends the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  a 
message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} through a secure channel to 
deregister the user. When 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives such message, then it 
deletes the corresponding data from its database. The user 
registration phase is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
E. Login and Authentication Phase 
During this phase, the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  will perform 
the following steps: 
 
1) Login Request by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  inserts his smart card into the card reader. He 
also provides his 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and imprints his biometrics to a 
specific device to generate biometric key 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 . Then, the 
user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If the verification fails, then he 
terminates the session. After that, he calculates 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 
and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 using (10), (31) and (32) respectively. 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)  (31) 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = ℎ(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) (32) 
𝑀𝑀1 = ℎ(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2) (33) 
𝑀𝑀2 = ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠)⨁𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 (34) 
 
He generates a secret random string 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 and calculates 𝑀𝑀1 
and 𝑀𝑀2 using (33) and (34) respectively. Then, he sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 
server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . 
2) Verification and Mutual Authentication Request by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives login message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  of the message with 
stored 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  with its server id. If the verification 
fails, then it terminates the session. If the verification 
passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺, then it proceeds. It calculates 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 
and 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 using (35) and (36) respectively and 𝑀𝑀3 by 
placing calculated 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 and 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 at (33). 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (35) 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 = 𝑀𝑀2⨁ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠) (36) 
𝑀𝑀5 = ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2)⨁𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 (37) 
 
Then, it compares whether 𝑀𝑀1 = 𝑀𝑀3 or not. If they are not 
equal, it terminates the session. Otherwise, the user is 
authenticated. It generates a secret random string 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3. It 
calculates 𝑀𝑀4 by replacing 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 with 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 at (33) and 𝑀𝑀5 
using (37). Then, it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐ℎ and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀4, 𝑀𝑀5, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . 
3) Mutual Authentication and Acknowledgement by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀4, 𝑀𝑀5, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
from the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . He verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  of the message. If the 
verification fails, then he terminates the session. If the 
verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐ℎ, then he proceeds. He 
calculates 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 using (38) and 𝑀𝑀6 by putting 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 and 
calculated 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 at (33). 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 = 𝑀𝑀5⨁ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ∥ 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2) (38) 
𝑀𝑀7 = ℎ(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3) (39) 
 
He compares whether 𝑀𝑀4 = 𝑀𝑀6 or not. If they are not 
equal, then he terminates the session. Otherwise, the server 
is authenticated. The user calculates 𝑀𝑀7 using (39) and sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐ℎ and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀7, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the server 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . If the session is terminated, he sends login request 
again. 
4) Verification and Finalization by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The server Si receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀7, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . 
Then, it checks 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  is desired user id, 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  
is desired server id and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐ℎ, then it calculates 𝑀𝑀8 
by putting 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 and 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 at (39). It compares whether 
𝑀𝑀7 = 𝑀𝑀8 or not. If they are not equal, it discards the 
message and terminates the session. Otherwise, the 
authentication is completed. 
5) Session Key Generation by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  and the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  both calculate the session key for further 
secret communication. The session key is calculated as 
follow: 
 
𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 = ℎ(𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 ∥ 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3) (40) 
 
The login and authentication phase is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
F. Password Change Phase 
  During password change phase, the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , the 
registration center 𝑅𝑅, and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  will perform the 
following steps: 
 
1) Password Change Request by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  inserts his smart card into the card reader. He 
also provides his 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and imprints his biometrics into 
a specific device to generate biometric key 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 . Then, the 
user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If the verification fails, he discards the 
process. Otherwise, he calculates 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠, 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 and 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 
using (20), (31), (32) and (41) respectively. 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠⨁𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 (41) 
 
Fig. 3.  Login and authentication phase which involves the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and the 
server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
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He also provides a new password 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 . Then, he 
calculates 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by replacing 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  at (20), sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure channel. 
2) Secret Change Request by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
from the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  with its database. If 
verification fails, then it discards the request. If the 
verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺, then it 
calculates 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠, 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 using (42), (25), (43) and 
(44) respectively and 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  by putting calculated 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 
at (23). 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (42) 
𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (43) 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠⨁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 (44) 
 
It compares whether 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 = 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 or not. If they are not equal, 
then the request is discarded. If they match, then it sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺, chooses a secret random string 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺4, 
calculates 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  by replacing 𝑃𝑃 and 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺4 and 
𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  respectively at (21) and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. If the 
process is discarded, then the 𝑅𝑅 sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and 
sends failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . If the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
receives this failure message, then he sends password 
change request again. 
3) Secret Change and Reply by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from 
the 𝑅𝑅. It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If the verification passes, 
then it proceeds. Otherwise, it discards the request. It 
calculates 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 using (22) and (35) respectively, and 
𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  by putting calculated 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 at (23), and compares 
whether 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  or not. If they are not equal, then it 
discards the request. If they match, then it calculates 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  
and 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by replacing 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at 
(23) and (24) respectively. It replaces 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  in its 
database. Then, it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure channel. If the 
process is discarded, then it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and sends a 
failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅. If the 𝑅𝑅 
receives this failure message, then it sends secret change 
request again. 
4) Smart Card Update Request by 𝑅𝑅 
The R receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺, 
then it assumes that the update process in the server has 
completed. Otherwise, if the verification fails, then it 
discards the process. When it gets the confirmation of the 
completion of the server update, then it calculates 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  by 
replacing 𝑃𝑃 with 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺4 at (26), and 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 using (42), sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
to the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. If the process is 
discarded, it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and sends a failure message 
{𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . If the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives this failure 
message, then it simply reverts database changes. The 𝑅𝑅 
sends secret change request to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  again. 
5) Smart Card Update and Acknowledgement by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
from the 𝑅𝑅. Then he checks 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If they are 
correct and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺, then he calculates 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  
using (31) and compares whether 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  or not. If the 
verification passes, then he sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 and 
sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure channel. 
Then, he calculates 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by replacing 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at 
(27) and replaces 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  in the smart card. If any 
of the verifications fails, then he rejects the reply. If the 
reply is rejected, then he discards the process, sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and sends a failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
to the 𝑅𝑅 and retries password change again. If the 𝑅𝑅 
receives this failure message, then it sends a failure 
message to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  to revert database changes and the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
does accordingly. 
6) Database Update and Finalization by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  and  
verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺, then it confirms that the card has updated and 
it calculates 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by replacing 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  
and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at (30) and (29) respectively. It also 
replaces 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  into its own 
database. Otherwise, if the verification fails, then it 
discards the process. The 𝑅𝑅 sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and sends a 
failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  and the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  to 
revert their changes and they act accordingly. The 
password change phase is illustrated in Fig. 4. 
G. Password Recovery Phase 
If the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  forgets his password, then 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , the registration 
center 𝑅𝑅, and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  will have to perform the following 
steps: 
 
1) Password Recovery Request by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  needs to provide his user identification 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 
collect server identification 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  which is published 
publicly. Then he sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅 and sends 
message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure 
channel. 
2) User Verification Request by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the user 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅, then it proceeds. Otherwise, if 
verification process fails, then it terminates the process. It 
 
Fig. 4.  Password change phase which involves the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , the registration 
center 𝑅𝑅 and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
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generates a secret random string 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺5 and calculates 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐  
as follow: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 (𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ) (45) 
 
It sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅 and sends a message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺5, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the recovery contact (𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ) of the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
through a secure channel. 
3) Verification Reply by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺5, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from 
the 𝑅𝑅. Then he checks 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If they are correct and 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅, then he proceeds. He sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅, 
chooses a new password 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , calculates 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by 
replacing 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  at (20) and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺5, 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure channel. 
Otherwise, if verification fails, then he simply discards the 
message and sends recovery request again. 
4) Finalization of Verification and Secret Change Request by 
Registration Center 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺5, 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from 
the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes 
and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅, then it verifies 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺5. If it holds, then it 
confirms that the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  is valid. Otherwise, if any of the 
verifications fails, then it discards the message. If the user 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  is valid, then it chooses a secret random string 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺6, 
calculates 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 using (43), and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  by replacing 𝑃𝑃 and 
𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺6 and 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  respectively at (21). Then, it sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
to the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. 
5) Secret Change and Reply by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from 
the 𝑅𝑅. It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes, then it 
proceeds; otherwise, it discards the request. It calculates 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 
and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 using (22) and (35) respectively, and 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  by putting 
calculated 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 at (23), and compares whether 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  or not. If they are not equal, then it discards the 
request. If they match, then it calculates 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  and 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by 
replacing 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at (23) and (24) 
respectively and replaces 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  in its database. 
Then, it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to 
the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure channel. If the process is discarded, 
then it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and sends a failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅. If the 𝑅𝑅 receives the failure message, 
then it sends secret change request again. 
6) Smart Card Update Request by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺, then 
it assumes that the update process in the server has 
completed. Otherwise, if verification fails, then it discards 
the process. When it has the confirmation of the 
completion of the server update, then it calculates 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  by 
replacing 𝑃𝑃 with 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺6 at (26), and 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 using (42). It sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to 
the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. If the process is 
discarded, it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 and sends a failure 
message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . If the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives this 
failure message, then it simply reverts database changes. 
The 𝑅𝑅 sends secret change request to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  again. 
7) Smart Card Update and Acknowledgement by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
from the 𝑅𝑅. Then he checks 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If they are 
correct and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺, then he calculates 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  using 
(31) and compares whether 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  or not. If 
verification passes, then he sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 and 
sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure channel. 
Then, he calculates 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by replacing 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at 
(27) and replaces 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  in the smart card. If any 
of the verifications fails, then he rejects the reply. If the 
reply is rejected, he discards the process, sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 
and sends a failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 and 
retries password recovery again. If the 𝑅𝑅 receives this 
failure message, then it sends a failure message to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  to 
revert database changes and the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  does accordingly. 
8) Database Update and Finalization by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It 
verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺, then it confirms that the card has updated and 
it calculates 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by replacing 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  
and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at (30) and (29) respectively. It also 
replaces 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  into its own 
database. Otherwise, if verification fails, then it discards 
the process. The 𝑅𝑅 sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and sends a failure 
message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  and the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  to revert 
their changes and they act accordingly. The Password 
recovery phase is illustrated in Fig. 5. 
H. Smart Card Recovery Phase 
If the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  loses his smart card, then he, the registration 
center 𝑅𝑅 and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  will have to perform the following 
steps: 
1) Smart Card Recovery Request by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  needs to provide his user identification 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 
collect server identification 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  which is published 
publicly. Then, he sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 and sends 
message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure 
channel. 
2) User Verification Request by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the user 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆, then it proceeds. Otherwise, if 
verification process fails, then it terminates the process. It 
generates a secret random string 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺7 and calculates 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐   Fig. 5.  Password recovery phase which involves the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , the registration 
center 𝑅𝑅 and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
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using (45). It sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 and sends a message 
{𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺7, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the recovery contact (𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐 ) of 
the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. 
3) Verification Reply by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺7, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from 
the 𝑅𝑅. Then, he checks 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If they are correct 
and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆, then he proceeds. He sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆, chooses a new password 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , calculates 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  
by replacing 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  at (20) and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺7, 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure channel. 
Otherwise, if verification fails, then he simply discards the 
message and sends recovery request again. 
4) Finalization of Verification and Secret Change Request by 
Registration Center 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺7, 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from 
the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes 
and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆, then it verifies 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺7. If it holds, then 
it confirms that the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  is valid. Otherwise, if any of the 
verifications fails, it discards the message. If the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  is 
valid, then it chooses a secret random string 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺8, 
calculates 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 using (43) and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  by replacing 𝑃𝑃 and 
𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺8 and 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  respectively at (21). Then, it sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. 
5) Secret Change and Reply by 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
The server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from 
the 𝑅𝑅. It verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆, then it proceeds; otherwise, it 
discards the request. It calculates 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 and 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 using (22) and 
(35) respectively, and 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  by putting calculated 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 
at (23), and compares whether 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  or not. If they are 
not equal, then it discards the request. If they match, then it 
calculates 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  and 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by replacing 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  and 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at (23) and (24) respectively, and replaces 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  
with 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  into its database. Then, it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆 
and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 through a secure 
channel. If the process is discarded, then it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and sends a failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 
𝑅𝑅. If the 𝑅𝑅 receives this failure message, then it sends 
secret change request again. 
6) Smart Card Preparation and Delivery by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  and verifies 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆, 
then it assumes that the update process in the server has 
completed. Otherwise, if verification fails, then it discards 
the process. When it has the confirmation of the 
completion of the server update, it calculates 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  by 
replacing 𝑃𝑃 with 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺8 at (26) and 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 using (42). It stores 
{𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠} into a smart card and distributes it 
to the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  through a secure channel. If the process is 
discarded, it sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 and sends a failure message 
{𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . When the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives this 
failure message, it simply reverts database changes. The 𝑅𝑅 
sends secret change request to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  again. 
7) Smart Card Receive and Acknowledgement by 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
The 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  receives smart card from the 𝑅𝑅. Then, the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  puts 
his smart card into a card reader. Then, he checks 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If they are correct, then the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  provides 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 
imprints his biometrics to the specific device to generate 
biometric key 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 . Then, he calculates 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  by replacing 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  with 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  at (20) and compares whether 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  
or not. If verification passes, then he accepts the card, sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆 and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑅𝑅 
through a secure channel. Then, he calculates 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by 
replacing 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at (27), and replaces 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  with 
𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  in the smart card. He also removes 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  from the 
card. If verification fails, he discards the process, sets 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶, sends a failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to 
the 𝑅𝑅 trough a secure channel and sends recovery request 
again. If the 𝑅𝑅 receives this failure message, then it sends a 
failure message to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  to revert database changes and the 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  does it accordingly. 
8) Database Update and Finalization by 𝑅𝑅 
The 𝑅𝑅 receives {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 . It 
verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . If verification passes and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =
𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆, then it confirms that the card has reached to its 
designated user and it calculates 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  by 
replacing 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 with 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  at (30) and 
(29) respectively. It also replaces 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  with 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  
with 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  into its own database. Otherwise, if verification 
fails, then it discards the process. The 𝑅𝑅 sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 
and sends a failure message {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} to the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  and 
the 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  to revert their changes and they act accordingly. The 
Smart card recovery phase is illustrated in Fig. 6. 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section, we will show how our scheme can resist 
security attacks and prevent the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  to cause any 
potential harm. 
A. Password Guessing Attack 
If the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  can manage to steal the smart card, then he 
can manage to extract information from the card by examining 
the power consumption signal [17]-[18]. He can collect 
information like 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  from it. The 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  is an encrypted 
information and contains 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 within it. Moreover, we can 
clearly see from (26) that 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 holds no information about 
password. Also, he can manage to get messages like {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
 
Fig. 6.  Smart card recovery phase which involves the user 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , the 
registration center 𝑅𝑅 and the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  
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𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐}, {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀4, 𝑀𝑀5, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐}, {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑀𝑀7, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} and {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from login and 
authentication phase by eavesdropping the insecure channel. 
The 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑀𝑀5 and 𝑀𝑀7 are calculated using (33), (34), (37) 
and (39) respectively. The 𝑀𝑀4 is calculated by replacing 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 
with 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 at (33). But, none of these messages contain 
password directly. So, there is no way the attacker can conduct 
password guessing attack by trial and error basis. 
B. Secret Key Stealing 
The master secret key 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 is not stored in the smart card. To 
generate 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, the attacker needs to decrypt 𝑄𝑄𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  to get 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 and 
also needs biometric key 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  and password 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 . From section 
A, we can say that the attacker cannot manage to get password 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 . At the same time biometric key 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖  is very hard to copy. 
Therefore, the attacker cannot generate 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 from smart card. 
At the trusted registration center, we store 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑈𝑈𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  and 
𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠. From (29), (30) and (19), we can see all these data are 
encrypted. Unless the attacker can manage to get 𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , it is 
almost impossible for him to get 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 and 𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠. Without 
these, he cannot generate master secret key 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠. 
At the server, we store 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠. From (24) and (18), we 
can see that all these data are encrypted. Unless the attacker 
can manage to get 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , it is almost impossible for him to get 
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠. 
Because 𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  and 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  both are AES keys and kept secret 
by the trusted registration center and the server respectively, 
we assume that the attacker won’t be able to get them. 
Therefore, the attacker cannot get 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 from the trusted 
registration center and the server. 
The attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  can gather login messages like 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑀𝑀4, 
𝑀𝑀5 and 𝑀𝑀7 by forging into the insecure channel which is used 
during login and authentication phase. Here, 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 and 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 are 
two secret random strings generated during login, and 
authentication phase and they change every time during 
message generation. Therefore, there is no way to collect these 
strings. This is why, it is nearly impossible for an attacker to 
guess 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 from these messages. 
C. User Impersonation Attack 
To conduct user impersonation attack, the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  needs 
to send login request {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐}. More 
precisely, he needs to generate 𝑀𝑀1 and 𝑀𝑀2 using (33) and (34) 
respectively. From previous discussion at subsection VI(B), 
we know that the attacker cannot manage 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 and 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2. So, it is 
not possible for him to generate 𝑀𝑀1 and 𝑀𝑀2. Therefore, he 
cannot impersonate as user. 
D. Server Masquerading Attack 
To conduct server masquerading attack, the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  need 
to send mutual authentication request {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀4, 𝑀𝑀5, 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐}. More precisely, he needs to generate 𝑀𝑀4 and 𝑀𝑀5 using 
(33) and (37) respectively. From previous discussion at 
subsection VI(B), we already know that the attacker cannot 
manage 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 and 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3. So, it is not possible for him to 
generate 𝑀𝑀4 and 𝑀𝑀5. Therefore, he cannot masquerade as 
server. 
E. Replay Attack 
In this case, the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  may use captured 𝑀𝑀1 and 𝑀𝑀2 for 
sending a login request or captured 𝑀𝑀7 for sending 
acknowledgement. Let us consider that 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  sends a login 
request {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} using captured 𝑀𝑀1 and 𝑀𝑀2 
to the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . Here, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺. The server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  receives 
this request and verifies 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐. It also generates 
𝑀𝑀3 and tries to match it with 𝑀𝑀1. Since the received message 
is a valid login message, it will pass all the verifications. Then, 
the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  sets 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐ℎ and sends {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀4, 𝑀𝑀5, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} 
to the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 . After receiving {𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀4, 𝑀𝑀5, 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐} from the 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , he tries to calculate 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 and 𝑀𝑀6. But, he cannot do that 
because 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 and 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺2 are unknown to him. Therefore, he cannot 
generate 𝑀𝑀7. If he sends a captured 𝑀𝑀7 to the server 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , it will 
fail the verification because the 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  will calculate 𝑀𝑀8 with 
recently generated 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 and it will not match with previously 
generated 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺3 which was used to calculate 𝑀𝑀7. Therefore, the 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  will discard the message and terminate the session.   
F. Mutual Authentication 
According to [15], if a scheme is insecure against 
impersonation attack and server masquerading attack, then it 
cannot provide mutual authentication. However, we have 
shown that our scheme can provide security against 
impersonation attack at subsection VI(C) and server 
masquerading attack at subsection VI(D). Therefore, we can 
say our scheme provides mutual authentication. 
G. Password and Smart Card Recovery 
Our scheme also consists of very good and secure password 
and smart card recovery options. A user needs to provide a 
correct and trusted recovery contact during registration and 
follow the password or smart card recovery steps.  
H. Prevents Denial of Service (DoS) Attack 
If any scheme uses biometric templates directly, then there 
exists a possibility that sometimes it may fail to match the 
provided templates with stored templates. It is due to existence 
of noise or different orientation of imprinting the biometrics, 
etc. However, our scheme does not use templates directly. We 
use algorithms which rely on biometric cryptosystem or 
cancellable biometrics technology and can release unique 
biometric key from the templates which are relatively close 
enough. This is how our scheme prevents denial of service 
(DoS) attack. 
I. Forgery Attack 
In this attack, the attacker 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  may forge into the insecure 
channel and manage to get messages which are used during 
login and authentication phase. But, he cannot use these 
messages to gather any information to generate future login 
and authentication messages. We have already shown that how 
the scheme prevents user impersonation attack and server 
masquerading attack. The attacker may also try to use old 
messages to gain access. We have shown that how our scheme 
can resist replay attack. So, considering all these analysis we 
can say our scheme can resist forgery attack. 
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J. Session Key Support 
 The session key is required to conduct further secret 
communication between the user and the server after login. 
Our scheme provides a mechanism to generate session key 
during the authentication phase. It reduces the overhead of 
computation and communication, and also provides the 
opportunity to conduct further secret communication 
smoothly. 
K. Comparison with Existing Schemes 
 Comparisons among our scheme and few of the existing 
schemes in terms of security features and functionality are 
summarized in Table 2. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a secure three factor user 
authentication scheme using biometric and smart card. 
Through security analysis, we have shown that our scheme 
outperforms existing schemes in terms of security and 
features. Our proposed scheme uses the strength of AES to 
prevent the attacker from stealing data as well as resists 
several attacks to ensure the security of the login and 
authentication mechanism. Moreover, it provides password, 
and smart card recovery options. Our scheme also supports 
session key agreement to ensure the further secret 
communication, reduces the overhead of computation and 
communication. It also uses secure key generation process to 
generate biometric keys from biometrics. We have depicted a 
comparison table with few of the existing schemes and our 
proposed scheme which clearly shows the security advantages 
of our scheme over those schemes. 
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TABLE 2 
SECURITY FEATURES AND FUNCTIONALITY COMPARISON 
Properties S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Prevents Password Guessing Attack Y Y N Y N 
Prevents Security Key Stealing Y N N N N 
Prevents User Impersonation Attack Y Y N Y N 
Prevents Server Masquerading 
Attack 
Y N N N N 
Prevents Replay Attack Y Y Y Y Y 
Password Recovery Y N N N N 
Smart Card Recovery Y N N N N 
Provides Mutual Authentication Y N N N N 
Prevents Denial of Service Attack Y N N N Y 
Prevents Forgery Attack Y N N N Y 
Supports Session Key Y N N N Y 
S1 = Proposed Scheme, S2 = Scheme proposed by Hwang et al. [11], S3 = 
Scheme proposed by Das [14], S4 = Scheme proposed by An [15], S5 = 
Scheme proposed by Li et al. [16]. 
Y = Yes, N = No. 
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